The Nile River is not only the largest but also the longest international river system in the world, and it presents unabated challenge that may shape and dominate the national security strategies of states in the region. In other words, the next war in the Nile River Basin will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics (Klare, 2001).
The Nile River is one of the Africa’s greatest assets. Throughout history it has sustained livelihoods, an array of ecosystems and rich diversity of cultures (Kieyah, 2007). It crosses eleven (11) countries and drains a catchment area of about 2.8m sq. kms, which is one-tenth of Africa’s total landmass. The Nile has three main tributaries; the White Nile, the Blue Nile and the Atbara. The White Nile drains the upper riparian countries; Burundi, Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The Blue Nile drains the Ethiopian highlands carrying on average 59% of the Nile water. Like the Blue Nile, Atbara rises from the Ethiopian plateau and drains parts of Eritrea before merging into Nile River 200 miles north of Khartoum. Thus, this undoubtedly puts Ethiopia to the position as the highest contributor of water to the Nile River.
Although, there has been no major water-related conflict in the over 260 existing international river systems in the world which constitute 60% of the earth’s fresh water supply, if states refuse to cooperate to share water resources, it may lead to potential inter-state conflicts. This is because trans-boundary rivers are shared by multiple sovereign states which create conflicting demands on the river’s resources and further complicate the already difficult political legacies. With this order of things, therefore, water is now a major source of friction amongst states, and the 21st century may see wars being fought over water.
Egypt is nowadays preoccupied with the existential threat posed by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam(GERD), which Egypt regards as more urgent and pressing than all the other threats to her national security.
Ethiopia embarked on the construction of the dam three months into the historic 2011 Egyptian revolution, as the heaven’s sent opportunity to realize a decades-long dream to change the fortunes of the impoverished country. The dam is being built in the Benishangul area of the Blue Nile, 40km from the Sudanese border and 700km from the capital Addis Ababa. The Blue Nile provides 86 per cent of the total Nile water revenues upon which Sudan relies partially and Egypt completely. When fully operational, the dam will become the largest hydro-electric plant in Africa and perhaps, the seventh in the whole world, providing power to some 65 million Ethiopians, who currently lack regular electricity supply. Once complete, the dam will have an estimated storage capacity of 74 billion cubic metres (BCM), which is almost equivalent to the water share of the Nile River of Egypt and Sudan combined, and generate more than 6,000 megawatts of electricity, approximately three times the production of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. This is interpreted by the Egyptian authorities, as a deliberate move by the Ethiopia, to exterminate Egyptians; a movie they will not sit and watch as they perish, but rather fight for their survival.
It is evident that all the Egyptian successive regimes have always invoked the historic rights as given by the 1929 treaty, and they have always sworn a brightest star in the sky, never to hesitate to go to war with any country that dare tampers with the flow of the waters of the Nile. It is alleged that every Egyptian born-child is given an injection in the head-to instil brevity and vigilance to the child so as to know that River Nile as the only source of life. More so, the Egyptian army is trained and made to swear an oath to protect their sovereignty and the source of the Nile. Egypt’s endless drumming for war has precipitated other riparians to highly invest in defence systems in anticipation for war. This kind of behaviour creates a lasting mistrust, suspicion and tension between riparian states, thus, the high possibility of a war over the Nile.
In 1892, the UK occupied Egypt to serve its commercial interests. It wanted to protect its interest in Suez Canal and to address the shortage of cotton in the world market. In the early 1900s, the UK government began to promote cotton cultivation in Egypt and Sudan, then under UK-Egyptian condominium rule. Since cotton could only be cultivated in the summer, a shift from the traditional seasonal flood-fed method to perennial irrigation became necessary. This shift precipitated an intensive period of Nile River development that generated intense debate over the interests of upper and lower riparian countries
Although, there were a number of protocols that sought to govern the utilization of the Nile waters either directly or indirectly, such as; the 1891 Anglo-Italian Agreement, the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, the 1906 Tripartite Treaty (between France, Britain and Italy),and the1925 Anglo-Italian Agreement; these earlier agreements were primarily between the colonial powers that had laid claim to different African territories.
The 1929 treaty is regarded as the existing legal instrument regarding the usage and management of waters of the Nile. It was signed between Egypt and Britain (on behalf of majority of other Nile riparian countries. This agreement provided Egypt an exclusive right to use Nile waters. The agreement provided that: No irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile or its tributaries, or on the lakes from which it flows in so far as all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration, which would entail prejudice to the interests of Egypt.
This colonial agreement conferred 48 and 4 billion cubic meters of water for Egypt and Sudan respectively. Egypt was also been given “the right to inspect and veto upstream water projects that would affect the volume and perennial flow of the river.
Following its independence in 1956, Sudan repudiated the 1929 Nile Agreement hence the 1959 agreement was signed between Egypt and Sudan which allocated 55.5 and 18.5 bcm to Egypt and Sudan respectively and leaving 10 bcm for evaporation and other factors out of average annual Nile flow, which is agreed to be 84 bcm, the agreement totally excluded other riparian countries all in all.
Upon their independence other upstream riparian states contested and protested the colonial agreements based on the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. This doctrine allows a party to rescind a treaty if there is a material change of circumstances that transform the rights and obligation of the treaty They argued that their accession to independence amounted to a vital change of circumstances hence rendering the 1929 and 1959 agreements obsolete and anachronistic, and thus irrelevant regarding the usage and management of the Nile River.
More so, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, regulating treaties between States, lies at the heart of international law. Article 34 makes it categorical clear that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third party without its consent. This article makes the 1929 and 1959 colonial agreements between Egypt and Britain, and Egypt and Sudan respectively, invalid to the extent that they purport to bind post-colonial third-party upstream nations.
This article is in tandem with Knobelsdorf’s doctrine of the Clean Slate, under this doctrine it was established that newly independent states do not inherit the agreements of their colonial predecessors, so long as the treaty does not demarcate territorial or other lines. In other words, this doctrine presupposes the total destruction of the previous state identity and the creation of a new international legal person; it attributes to the new state a basic right to legal self-determination.
Every arrangement that has been attempted to govern the use of the Nile, especially, the Comprehensive Framework Agreement brokered by the Nile Basin Initiative, has been jeopardized by Egypt and Sudan by upholding their historic rights claim, a position that has been rejected by other riparian. Persistent failure to reach a just settlement on the management of the river has bred continuous tension, suspicion, mistrust and arms race between the riparian states; which has disastrous implications for the region.
Although conflict over the allocation of the waters of the Nile River has existed for many years, the dispute, especially that between Egypt and Ethiopia, significantly escalated when the latter commenced construction of the dam on the Blue Nile in 2011. Ethiopia, whose highlands supply more than 85 percent of the water that flows into the Nile River, has long argued that it has the right to utilize its natural resources to address widespread poverty and improve the living standards of its people.
As I write this article there is a political crisis in Ethiopia under the leadership of the 2019 and 100th Nobel Peace Prize winner, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The ongoing riots in Oromia and Wolayta, state fragmentation in the Amhara region, and the standoff between the federal government and the Tigray region have put the survival of the government in question. It is beyond reasonable doubt that Ethiopia is on the verge of a civil war. Nevertheless, the influence of external invisible hand in the region cannot be ruled out in this order of things. All these internal dynamics in the Horn of Africa’s most populous nation and the struggle for hegemony in the Nile Basin have spill over effects and disastrous implications for regional security.
One would wonder whether it was/is a coincidence or by design, Ethiopia started the construction of the great dam, three months into the 2011 Egyptian revolution; and months after months Ethiopia announced her plans to start filling the Renaissance dam, a political crisis emerges in Ethiopia. These events leave a lot to be desired!
In conclusion therefore, a regional framework for the management of the Nile already exists—the Nile Basin Initiative—which is a partnership among the Nile riparian states that was launched in 1999. It can help the riparian states outline principles, rights, and obligations for cooperative management of the resources of the Nile. These countries should return to the NBI’s Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which was concluded iin 2010,, try to resolve the disagreements that caused Egypt and Sudan to decline to sign the CFA, and use it as a model for a future binding legal regime. A multilateral approach is the only magical bullet to the River Nile question.
Egypt and Sudan should be flexible enough to accommodate the stressing needs of other riparian states regarding the usage of the waters and other resources of the Nile. Sooner should they appreciate that agreements without reciprocal obligations like those on the Nile River are deemed to be invalid, and thus a new framework for a win-win situation is paramount.
Bosco Asiimwe – Is the Director of Democratic Governance at the Centre for Multilateral Affairs
