It is a decade now, since Ethiopia took a unilateral decision to announce its intentions to construct the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD), the largest hydropower facility in Africa on the Blue Nile in April, 2011. The Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to construct, fill and operate the mega dam gave sleepless nights to River Nile downstream riparians (that is Egypt and Sudan). In his letter (dated 11th June, 2021) to the United Nations Security Council, Sameh Shoukry, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, vividly portended that the current lack of progress in negotiations, Ethiopia’s continued intransigence and its policy of unilateralism, which is embodied in its determination to fill and operate the GERD without regard to its impact on Egypt and Sudan, could have serious ramifications that threaten peace and security thought the region. He reiterated that it is strategically untenable for Egypt to allow its survival to be dependent on an upstream state.
Since the groundbreaking ceremony for the GERD construction that was held on April, 2nd 2011, Egypt and Sudan, the downstream countries that are affected by the introduction of such a major project into the hydrological system of the Blue Nile which were neither notified nor consulted; commenced the historic journey in search for a legally binding agreement that should ensure the rights and equities of the three riparian states and minimise the adverse effects of the GERD including mitigation measures to address the impact of filling and the operation of the GERD and the future periods of drought. Ethiopia has consistently kept a deaf ear over these proposals by the downstream countries but rather willing to reaching the ‘rules and guidelines’ that are only limited to the filling of the dam as opposed to a binding agreement.
Against that background, a number of rounds of negotiations were held in search for the lasting solution to the GERD question. These negotiations have hit a deadlock, despite being brokered by such actors of leverage and indispensible clout both in the region and at the international stage. These rounds of negotiations have failed to reach a negotiated settlement because of persistent unwillingness of parties to the negotiations to reach an agreement in the blatant show of power and continuous vexing and wrestling for the hegemonic posture in the Horn of Africa. Hence, the Zero-sum negotiations in regard to the fragile GERD question.
These attempts and rounds of negotiations include; The International Panel of Experts (IPoE); The Malabo Statement and the Tripartite National Committee (TNC); The 2015 Agreement on Declaration of Principles (DoP); The TNC, the Nine-Party Mechanism and Studies Recommended by the IPoE; The National Independent Scientific Research Group (NISRG); Mediation efforts by the US and the World Bank Group and the Washington Agreement; Negotiations held upon an Invitation from H.E The Prime Minister of Sudan; UN Security Council session on the GERD; and the AU-led Negotiations.
Ethiopia’s intransigence and its procedural prevarication have been well argued by the downstream states, as the cause of all these failed rounds of negotiations. However, since time immemorial, the negotiating posture and the rigidity of downstream riparians to historical rights of the 1929 and 1959 agreements, have since de-motivated upstream riparians in engaging in any meaningful negotiations in search for the lasting solution to the equitable management and usage of the waters of the Nile, and thus, prompted them to act otherwise, in this case, Ethiopia. A case in point Egypt and Sudan have up to now neither signed nor ratified the Comprehensive Framework Agreement which intends to establish principles, rights and obligations to ensure long-term and sustainable management and development of the shared Nile waters. This treaty has been negotiated under the auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) (an intergovernmental partnership of all River Nile riparian states) since 2000.
More so, the language with which Sudan was delegated some rights over management and usage of the waters of the Nile in 1959 agreement was finally learnt and thus spoken by Ethiopia in regard to the GERD question. In other words, Ethiopia (being the leading contributor to the waters of the Nile with 85%) intends to exploit the GERD opportunity to improve her leverage and negotiate an agreement that will ensure unquestionable, unregulated and unfettered rights in the usage of the waters of Blue Nile. This will again help and improve Ethiopia’s hegemonic credentials in the Horn of Africa.
Now, that Egypt has opted for burden sharing and benefit sharing at the expense of the absolute rights and ownership over the usage and management of the Nile waters as par the 1929 agreement, but rather lean on the general applicable rules of international law, which include; the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, the obligation not to cause harm, and the obligation to cooperate. This order of things is likely to bring a breath of fresh air in reaching a negotiated agreement that will ensure the equitable management of waters of the Nile as advanced by the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) of the NBI, to which Egypt and Sudan had blatantly refused to append their signatures.
Ethiopia seems to lack a political will to reach a fair and balanced agreement on the GERD. Ethiopia is categorical to reaching ‘guidelines and rules’ that are limited to the filling of the GERD by the three countries instead of a binding agreement, thus, discounting the operation rules of the dam. More so, Ethiopia proposes an arrangement for the exchange of the technical data on the refilling of the GERD, all of which after will be suspended upon the completion of the filling process of the dam.
Ethiopia is seemingly buying time to continue engaging in the facade of negotiations, while working hard to ensure that these talks do not yield any progress and do not lead to articulating solutions to outstanding legal and technical issues. This would provide Ethiopia with a political cover of negotiation while it proceeds with the construction, filling and operation of the GERD unilaterally. In its response to the Arab League resolution (where the foreign ministers of the 22 member-bloc held an extraordinary meeting in the Qatari capital, Doha to call on the UNSC to intervene in the lingering matter between the three countries), Ethiopia argued that whereas Egypt sees the GERD as an existential threat, Ethiopia sees it also as an existential matter of interest in the pursuit of it economic growth and development aspirations. Thus, Ethiopia’s policy of intransigence and procedural prevarication was overtly expressed throughout several rounds of the GERD negotiations.
Plantey (2007) posits that negotiation transcends a simple dialogue; it is the best way of leading parties to an agreement. He argues that for parties to reach a negotiated settlement, they should exhibit the principles of good faith, prudence, dexterity and above all political will to reach consensus under a win-win arrangement and, thus, manoeuvre a very contested and complex situation. In other words, the parties to the GERD negotiations must be both willing and able to explore fresh possibilities, renew the methods and project strategies into the future so as to avoid precarious results borne out of failed negotiations. In this context, gains by Ethiopia should be made by behaving with utmost moderation, and exaggerated demands by the downstream states should be contained, for they are not consonant with good faith.
In conclusion, therefore, firstly, in the course of any nation’s existence, and of the coexistence of nations with each other, every day brings its share of events, and international life refashions itself into new and different configurations on almost daily basis. In relations between states, nothing is settled, no position can be taken for granted and no judgement is set in stone. It is very unsafe to rely on any declaration that is not supported, or to treat any long-held claim as justified, or any undefended space as secure or any non-combatant authority as legitimate. The art of politics and negotiation requires those who practise it to adapt constantly to changing circumstances.
Secondly, a holistic negotiated settlement regarding the management, usage and equitable exploitation of River Nile resources involving all the riparian states is ideal as opposed to atomistic approach to settlement of individual cases as they arise. The negotiated settlement that is legally binding to all riparians on the management and usage of waters of the Nile would solve the River Nile question once for all, and thus, breeding a period of relative peace and stability in the fragile region.
