Introduction: Democracy Under Digital Siege
As Uganda approaches the 2026 general elections, the political landscape just as in previous elections will be increasingly defined by violence against opposition figures, activists, and human rights defenders. But beyond the visible crackdowns, a more insidious threat looms: digital repression.
Online surveillance, intimidation, and the erosion of digital privacy have become powerful tools for silencing dissent—especially for women and marginalized groups already battling structural silencing.
The 2026 vote will not only decide political leadership—it will determine whether Ugandans can still exercise their constitutional rights to free expression, assembly, and access to information in the digital age.
Digital Authoritarianism: A Gendered Lens
In my recent reflection, Safeguarding Digital Rights: Perspectives in Advocating for Structurally Silenced Women in Uganda, I documented how Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRDs), women with disabilities, sex workers, and LGBTQI individuals face targeted digital harassment, surveillance, and violations of privacy.
One WHRD put it bluntly:
“I can’t trust my phone and my shadow; every call feels like a trap.”
Uganda’s legal protections—Articles 21 (equality) and 27 (privacy) of the 1995 Constitution—are undermined by gaps in the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act (2010) and the Data Protection and Privacy Act (2019), which lack adequate judicial oversight, proportionality, and post-surveillance notification requirements.
Precedents of Control: Shutdowns and Surveillance
Uganda has a long history of using technology to control political space, as detailed in my 2021 study, Disconnecting from Cyberstability:
- 2006 – Access to Radio Katwe blocked for “malicious content” against the ruling party.
- 2011 – Facebook and Twitter blocked for 24 hours during “Walk to Work” protests.
- 2016 – Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, and mobile money services shut down on election day.
- 2018–2021 – VPN blocking threats, social media tax, and a five-day Internet blackout during the presidential polls, costing the economy an estimated USD 9 million.
With new social media monitoring tools reportedly procured by the Uganda Communications Commission and rising online abuse against women in politics (Daily Monitor), the threat for 2026 is both state-enabled and gender-specific.
Human Rights, Cyberstability, and Gendered Harm
Election-related digital repression not only violates constitutional rights—it undermines international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
From a cyberstability perspective, shutdowns and surveillance erode:
- Responsibility – The duty of governments and telecoms to preserve secure, stable Internet access.
- Restraint – The principle that no actor should engage in harmful ICT practices.
- Requirement to Act – The obligation to maintain the integrity and availability of online information.
- Respect for Human Rights – Upholding freedoms in digital as well as physical spaces.
For structurally silenced women, surveillance and shutdowns can mean loss of safety, silencing of advocacy, and erasure from the public sphere. As one activist told me:
“I stopped posting about my identity; the state might use it against me.”
The Economic and Social Toll
Shutdowns are not just political tools—they are economic wrecking balls. During the 2021 blackout:
- Banking systems froze – disrupting Real Time Gross Settlements and ATM services.
- Mobile money transactions collapsed – crippling both formal and informal economies.
- E-commerce platforms suffered – Jumia reported severe supply chain breakdowns, affecting access to essentials like food and medicine.
For women entrepreneurs and informal traders who rely heavily on social media marketing, such disruptions erase livelihoods overnight.
Urgent Recommendations for 2026
Government
- Amend RICA to require judicial oversight and proportionality in surveillance.
- Strengthen the gender-sensitive application of the Data Protection Act.
- Repeal laws that criminalize identity and expression.
Telecom Companies & ISPs
- Publish transparency reports detailing government shutdown and surveillance requests.
- Alert customers promptly when disruptions are ordered.
- Collaborate with civil society to build emergency mitigation strategies.
Civil Society & Media
- Expand digital literacy training for women, WHRDs, and persons with disabilities.
- Document and publicly report all digital rights violations.
- Establish pre-election emergency response networks for activists and journalists.
International Partners
- Condemn surveillance tools targeting marginalized groups.
- Support intersectional advocacy and emergency protection programs.
- Condition electoral support on commitments to keep the Internet open.
Conclusion: Defending the Digital Ballot
The integrity of Uganda’s 2026 elections will not be determined solely by what happens at the ballot box—it will also depend on whether citizens can speak, organize, and mobilize freely online.
Shutting down the Internet, silencing voices through surveillance, or targeting structurally silenced women is an assault on democracy itself.
Uganda’s future cannot be decided in darkness. Keeping the Internet open is not a privilege—it is a democratic necessity.