South Sudan’s latest peace deal has been lauded as a milestone in the country’s long road to peace and stability. The Revitalised Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) outlines power-sharing arrangements between rivals; President Salva Kiir and main rebel/opposition leader Riek Machar, and provides a blueprint for a sustainable peace and democratic transition.
Despite this welcome development; South Sudan’s revitalised peace process has been marred by delays, uncertainty, divisions and the regionalisation of the conflict. As a result, key issues relating to state boundaries and security arrangements remain unresolved, leaving the primary drivers of the conflict untouched. The civil war in South Sudan which broke out in 2013 – has cost an estimated 400 000 lives, displaced millions and plunged the nascent country into a state of deprivation. South Sudan and its people must urgently facilitate a return to peace, stability, reconciliation and unity.
On 15th August 2015, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict of South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed. It had the following key features: A coalition government based on power-sharing between the government, the SPLM/A-IO and the SPLM–Former Detainees (FDs); A permanent ceasefire; transitional security arrangements; and the establishment of a hybrid court to try those accused of war crimes. Under the agreement, Kiir would remain president of South Sudan, with Machar filling the position of vice president. The transitional period would facilitate and ensure the acceleration of constitutional reforms, economic stability, justice and social reconciliation before the election of a new and democratic government.
Upon Machar’s return to South Sudan in July 2016 for the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), clashes between the SPLA–In Government (SPLAIG) and the SPLA-IO in Juba heralded the collapse of the 2015 ARCSS and the renewal of violence.
The ARCSS collapsed for several reasons;
First, important provisions in the agreement that sought to demilitarise Juba by installing an external third-party force were ditched at the behest of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. As a result, Machar had to return to Juba with his own security forces, placing the SPLA-IG and SPLA-IO forces in close proximity in the capital amid extreme distrust between the two factions. The consequent outbreak of violence was a natural outcome of the failure of the security arrangements contained in the ARCSS.
Second, armed parties to the agreement used the provision that called for the cantonment of forces to mobilise new forces across the country and in areas that had enjoyed relative peace until then.
Third, Kiir unilaterally expanded the number of states from 10 to 28, then to 32. This move was viewed by many as an attempt by the central government to gerrymander power into the hands of the Dinka ethnic group and to (re)distribute administrative patronage at all levels of the state as part of a ‘payroll peace’.
Fourth, the implementation of key pre-transitional provisions of the agreement was far behind schedule by the time the TGoNU was formed, indicative of Kiir’s lack of political will and commitment to the peace process. It should be noted that Kiir only reluctantly signed the ARCSS. In a foreboding public statement made in September 2015, Kiir had proclaimed that;
“the ARCSS is the most divisive and unprecedented peace deal ever seen in the history of our country and the African continent at large … There is no doubt in my mind that the implementation of some of the provisions of the Agreement will be confronted by practical difficulties that will make it inevitable to review or amend such provisions”.
Main barriers to Progress
First, what has been especially worrisome since the signing of the agreement in 2018 is the frustratingly slow speed of implementation. Of all the institutions and mechanisms that need to be set up or reconstituted, only the National Pre-Transition Committee, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism have been established. Key security institutions/mechanisms were established and/or reconstituted months after their prescribed deadlines. Half of the provisions that were expected to be completed within the first six months have not even been initiated, nine others are ongoing and four others are minimally implemented.
Secondly, the issue of the number of states and their boundaries in South Sudan has been a thorny one in the peace process ever since Kiir unilaterally increased the number of states to 32 in 2015. As a result, the R-ARCSS mandated the Technical Boundary Committee (TBC), a consensual body comprising experts from IGAD and Troika member states, with defining and demarcating South Sudan’s tribal areas as they stood in January 1956. The idea was that the work and report of the TBC would feed into the work of the Independent Boundaries Committee (IBC), a body tasked with determining the number of states in South Sudan. The IBC submitted a report on its work on 18 June 2019. Yet the contentious issue of the number of states remained unresolved, as the report of the IBC was inconclusive on the issue and instead recommended a political solution to resolve the dispute.
The R-ARCSS provides for a referendum on the matter should the dispute over the number of states and the council of states not be resolved. This option is practically ambitious and riddled with inherent difficulties. Kiir eventually agreed to return the country to 10 states, just before the 22 February 2020 deadline lapsed. In addition to the 10 states are three ‘administrative areas’: Ruweng, Pibor and Abeiyi. Opposition parties are still aggrieved by the decision to include these areas, despite their agreeing to join the newly formed unity government.
This is partly owing to the fact that Ruweng is oil-rich and was heavily fought over during the civil war, raising fears that Kiir’s faction would retain significant control over the area and the much sough-after oil revenues. Ultimately, recognition of a fixed number of states is crucial for how a country will be governed. Should there be an impasse or disagreement on the appointment of governors, thereby creating a power vacuum, South Sudan could be faced with yet another failed attempt at finding lasting peace
Thirdly, security arrangements are more critical to the peace deal’s sustained stability. It is evident that, the failure to resolve and implement key security arrangements in time for the TGoNU led to the collapse of the ARCSS in 2016. Under the R-ARCSS, the main parties to the conflict have committed themselves to develop a security sector reform (SSR) strategy and merge their respective forces and militias to form a new unified army. While the general process of cantonment of forces in South Sudan has been slow since the signing of the agreement in September 2018, there has been some progress with the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission verifying 25 cantonment sites for opposition forces and 10 barracks for the South Sudanese national army. However, some forces deserted cantonment sites without training because of a lack of food and medicine
Nonetheless, there were still fundamental problems with the security arrangements.
First, the R-ARCSS widened cantonment and integration rights to the wider SSOA (South Sudan Operation Alliance). This led to the SSOA’s claiming non-existent numbers of active forces, giving it an opportunity to mobilise and recruit more forces to meet the claimed numbers.
Second, while the reconstitution and reintegration of armed forces can be the bedrock of mutual trust and nation building, South Sudan remains an ethnically polarised country and if these tensions are not mediated, they can undermine any Security sector Reforms efforts.
Third, some opposition parties’ withdrawal from the agreement – and/or their refusal to sign it (such as the NAS) – has left them outside the scope of the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. This has resulted in forces loyal to General Thomas Cirillo of the NAS engaging in sporadic clashes with the South Sudanese army in the Yei River area.
Lastly, the implementation of the security arrangements could stall further if Kiir fails to disperse the much-needed funds for the implementation of the deal
Recommendations
• There should be a political will to fully abide and implement all the aspects of R-ARCSS
• The agreement should be implemented in good faith by all the parties
• Deliberate efforts should be hastened to ensure ‘security sector reform’ . This will help build a national army with a national character accountable to civilian authority.
Conclusion
The signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018 has been an important turning point in South Sudan’s peace process. It provides a glimmer of hope to the people of South Sudan, who have had to endure years of suffering and bloodshed. The deal has also given rise to newfound hope for a lasting political settlement between Kiir, Machar and other political actors. Yet legitimate concerns about the commitment and capacity of the new unity government to institute much-needed reforms and fully implement the R-ARCSS remain.
While the R-ARCSS establishes numerous benchmarks and commitments the parties need to meet, the lack of prioritisation and political will on the part of the South Sudanese elite has imperilled the peace process. If there is no political will to achieve peace, the peace-making process is doomed from the very beginning. Therefore, the formation of the R-TGoNU should spur the parties to engage in good faith and to accelerate the implementation of key transitional period provisions.
